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ABSTRACT 
Due to high restrictions in wireless sensor networks, where the resources are limited, clustering protocols 
for routing organization have been proposed in much research for increasing system throughput, 
decreasing system delay and saving energy. Even these algorithms have proposed some levels of security, 
but because of their dynamic nature of communication, most of their security solutions are not suitable. In 
this paper we focus on how to achieve the highest possible level of security by applying new key 
management technique that can be used during wireless sensor networks communications. For our 
proposal to be more effective and applicable to a large number of wireless sensor networks applications, 
we work on a special kind of architecture that have been proposed to cluster hierarchy of wireless sensor 
networks and we pick one of the most interesting protocols that have been proposed for this kind of 
architecture, which is LEACH. This proposal is a module of a complete solution that we are developing to 
cover all the aspects of wireless sensor networks communication which is labeled Secure Object Oriented 
Architecture for Wireless Sensor Networks (SOOAWSN) . 
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Routing, Sec-LEACH (Secure LEACH), Network security, Random KD (Key Distribution), Multi-
Generation Keys. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are many advantages of using wireless sensor networks. One of these advantages is 
reducing the cost of the applications by having many sensors with little cost communicate with 
each other and with the base station providing full network function. At the same time sensor 
networks have some special characteristics compared to traditional networks which make it hard 
to deal with such kind of networks. The most important property that affects these types of 
network is the limitation of the available resources, especially the energy [1].  
Sensor networks are self organized networks, which makes them suitable for dangerous and 
harmful situations, but at the same time makes them easy targets for attack. For this reason we 
should apply some level of security so that it will be difficult to be attacked, especially when they 
are used in critical applications [1, 2]. 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [3, 4] are special kinds of Ad hoc networks that became one 
of the most interesting areas for researchers to study. Routing techniques are the most important 
issues for such kind of network where resources are limited. Cluster-base organization has been 
proposed to provide an efficient way to save energy during communication [5-9]. In this kind of 
organization, nodes are organized into clusters. Cluster heads (CHs) pass messages between 
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groups of nodes (group for each CH) and the base station (BS), (see figure1). This organization 
provides some energy saving, and that was the main idea for proposing this organization. 
Depending on this organization, LEACH (Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy) [10] added 
another interesting issue to this kind of network, security, where the CHs are rotating from node to 
node in the network making it harder for intruders to know the routing elements and attack them. 
 
Figure1. Cluster organization for sensor networks 
There are some existing works to improve the security of LEACH. One of the most interesting 
proposals is Sec-LEACH that provides an efficient security to pair-wise node-to-CH 
communication [11]. A modified version of LEACH is proposed that inherits its security from 
random key distribution technique. 
In this paper, we discuss existing work of LEACH and we focus on how to increase its security. In 
section two, we discuss the original work of LEACH. In section three we discuss two of the most 
interesting modifications proposed for LEACH to increase the performance and the security. In 
section four, we propose modification to enhance the security of LEACH. In section five, we 
evaluate the performance and security of our solution compared to other solutions. 
2 LEACH PROTOCOL 
LEACH was first proposed to reduce total energy consumption in sensor networks. It assumed 
that every node can directly communicate with a BS using a high enough transmitting power. By 
applying the clustered hierarchy, we can balance the energy consumption. Sensors send their 
messages to specific sensors which they will be considered as cluster heads (CHs). CHs then 
aggregate these messages and send them to BS. This process results in energy saving for nodes 
that are not involved in CHs since they can transmit with less transmission power, but at the same 
time we consume the energy of CHs. To solve this problem, LEACH proposed a dynamic CH 
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rotation which concluded that the CHs should change at each round. Each round, a new node will 
become a CH. The network chooses CHs using a distributed algorithm and then dynamically 
clustering the remaining nodes around CHs [10]. 
2.1 Description 
LEACH consists of two phases implying five steps at each network round. In this section we 
summarize the steps for single round. The phases are: the setup phase (initial phase) and the 
steady state phase (real transmission phase) [10, 11]. For the setup phase, each node decides the 
probability that it can be a CH for the current round while considering the energy and the 
knowledge of the desired percentage of CHs. Let us call these Ready Nodes RNs. RNs then 
broadcast advertising messages for the whole of the network. When the nodes receive all 
advertising messages, the remaining nodes will choose a CH depending on the highest signals 
received from RNs and then each of these nodes will send a message to the desired CH requesting 
to join it. When the CHs receive the messages, they start to broadcast the confirmation for these 
accepted nodes by sending confirmation messages with a time slot schedule for each node in the 
group. This time slot informs each node in that group on time to transmit its messages. 
The second phase concerns the transmission of the real data among the network. According to the 
time schedule  provided by CHs to other nodes, each will start sending its data to the proper CHs. 
CHs then collect the messages from their members, analyze and handle them, then send the results 
to the BS. 
2.2 Security in LEACH 
Jamming and spoofing are kinds of attacks that could be harmful to sensor networks. The nature 
of Cluster Hierarchy distribution networks may lead to harmful attacks, especially when these 
attacks rely on CHs for sending and receiving data. If a hacker decides to become a CH, this can 
result in a disrupted network. Selective forwarding and sinkhole attacks are examples of these 
kinds of attacks [11, 12]. 
In LEACH, the possibility for the network to be attacked by these kinds of attack is very small, 
because CHs are changing in each round of communication, making it hard for the intruders to 
know the expected CHs for each round so that they can disrupt the critical points of the network 
[10]. 
2.3 Improving LEACH 
By analyzing LEACH, we can determine the critical points of communication, and then we can 
focus on providing more efficient security at those points. One approach is to determine CHs in a 
way that it will be hard for the intruder to guess which nodes will be CHs.  
The easiest, and the most efficient way, is to prevent suspicious nodes from participating in the 
network, and this step should be taken at the time of network setup [11].  
By providing a secure way to prevent illegitimate nodes from participating in the network, we can 
achieve a good level of security and we can reduce the future workload of the network to support 
security. Some studies propose controlling access to the network for sensor networks, and most of 
these works are based on key distribution (KD) for cryptographic mechanisms (11, 13-19). 
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3 CURRENT RESEARCHES ON LEACH 
As we mentioned earlier, there are many techniques proposed as new modifications for LEACH 
to provide more security and to reduce energy consumption. In this section we will discuss two of 
these works and then we will propose some modifications for these two works.   
3.1 SLEACH 
SLEACH [20] proposed some additions to LEACH so that it can improve protection for the 
network. It is suggested that each node has to have two symmetric keys: a pairwise key shared 
with the BS and the last key chain held by the BS. According to that, it suggested small 
modifications to LEACH. For the setup phase, the message sent by RNs should consist of an 
encrypted message that contains the ID of the node that should receive the message and the ID of 
CH itself as a plain text, and the encryption (ID of CH, the counter shred by CH and the BS, and 
the advertisement message) using the message authentication code (MAC) that is produced using 
the shred key between CH and the BS.  
The nodes hold CHs IDs, and at the same time the BS will analyze the messages sent by CHs to 
authorize them. Any valid CH will then have its ID added to the list of valid nodes IDs. After that, 
the BS broadcasts the list with the encrypted list for all nodes in the network using µTESLA [21] 
broadcast authentication scheme. Now the nodes can recognize the authenticated RNs to be 
connected with, so these nodes send their requests to participate with CHs groups. CHs then 
broadcasts confirmation messages for approved nodes. Each message will contain the time slot 
schedule for each node. 
We can see in this proposed protocol that it does not provide full authentication for node-CH 
where the messages to be sent from the nodes to CH are not authenticated. 
Oliveria et.al propose another solution to provide some ways to pre-distribute the keys using 
random key pre-distribution for securing node-CH communication in LEACH [11]. 
3.2 Sec-LEACH- Random KD to LEACH 
Sec-LEACH [11] proposes some creative modifications to LEACH protocol. It shows how to 
invest the key pre-distribution scheme to secure node-to-CH communications. The main idea is to 
generate a large pool of keys and their IDs at the time the network is deployed, and then each 
node is assigned a group of these keys randomly. Also each node is assigned with a pair-wise key 
which shares with the BS; these keys are used during node-node and node-B.S. communications. 
This algorithm provides authenticity, confidentiality, and freshness for node-to-node 
communication. The security level is not impacted by the number of nodes; actually it depends on 
the size of the key group assigned for each node according to the total size of the key pool [11]. 
4 NEW KEY MANAGEMENT 
In this section first we briefly discuss the main drawbacks of the existing solutions, the whole 
architecture of our proposal for key management, and then we discuss each part of it in details. 
For this purpose we consider the whole solution as an object and each part of it as method that can 
be used individually or with other method in that solution. The main idea here is to break the 
whole problem into small problems at the beginning, and at the same time having the ability to 
apply different levels of security on the application according to the application needs. 
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As we discussed before, we deal with objects that have methods which can be used and directed 
in many ways to cover the security part of the application according to its needs. 
At the beginning we need to divide the security problem into its major parts to be able to deal with 
each part individually. First, we can divide it according to the type of communications that may 
appear in WSN, where we have node to node communication and node to B.S. communication. In 
order to have a secure network we need to secure these communications. For this purpose we need 
different kinds of keys to be used in securing these communications. We have three types of keys: 
Secret Key, sharing key, and private and public keys. Next we discuss the methods in our object 
for using these kinds of keys on a way that offers different levels of security. 
4.1 Key Pre-distribution (KP) Method 
In this method we apply the same technique that has been applied by Sec-Leach. The aim of this 
method is to have different levels of security on the network communication for the first 
generation of the network deployment (i.e. without the ability to add new sensors after the 
network is deployed). 
The idea is to create a pool of keys at the B.S. that has specific number of keys generated 
randomly using a pseudorandom number generator function. At the same time, the B.S. randomly 
generates key ID for each generated key which is unique for each key. The second step is to 
provide each sensor with group of keys with equal sizes for each sensor, and these keys has to be 
picked randomly without removing any key from the key pool. This leads the sensors to have 
some sharing keys between each other which make node-node communication possible (these 
keys called sharing keys). Meanwhile, the B.S. provides each sensor with at least one unique key 
(named Master Key) which is to be used to communicate between each node and the B.S.      
LEACH protocol can be securely applied as follows: After each sensor applied the self electing 
equation on itself and determine its ability to become a CH for the current round, the 
communication process starts with the setup phase. In this phase, each CH includes the IDs of the 
keys in its key group, a nonce in its advertising message offering its availability to become a CH. 
The ordinary nodes then choose an ID (r) that is shared with CH. Then each of these ordinary 
nodes sends the message to CH requesting to join its group. The message includes the ID of the 
node, ID of CH, r, join_ request message, and the encryption of node ID, CH ID, r and the nonce 
sent by CH) using MAC that is produced using a symmetric key associated with r. Each CH then 
sends a confirmation message to approved nodes containing the ID of CH and a group of pairs (ID 
and time slot for each node to start transmission).  
In steady state phase, the nodes transmit the messages to CHs according to the time slot provided 
before. Each message includes the ID of the node, the ID of desired CH, sensing report from the 
node, and the encryption (node ID, CH ID, node sensing report and the nonce+ reporting cycle 
within the current node) using the same MAC used before. Finally, CH starts sending the final 
data for the BS, and the message includes the ID of CH, the ID of BS, the aggregation data from 
all nodes, and the encryption (the aggregation data and the ID of CH) using the MAC produced 
from the ID of CH (Master Key of CH). 
As discussed by [11], this algorithm provides authenticity, confidentiality, and freshness for node-
to-node communication. The security level is not impacted by the number of nodes; actually it 
depends on the size of the key group assigned for each node according to the total size of the key 
pool. 
The last part of this section shows how we can determine the level of security that we need 
according to the application needs. 
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In WSN, there is a fixed space for each node to store the key group selected from the key pool. 
This means the size of the group (GS) is fixed at the first time the network is built. Then after GS 
is determined, the size of the key pool (PS) will affect the network in two ways 
1. Level of security: 
Depending on the variable names provided before, the security level can be given in this 
formula [11] 
Security level= 1- GS/PS 
This means: increasing the PS will provide us with higher level of security. 
2. Sharing keys probability 
The probability of two nodes not to share the key is given by the formula [11] 
P= [(PS-GS)!]2 / PS!*(PS-2GS)! 
This means: the probability for two nodes to share the key is decreased by increasing the size of 
the key pool. 
Since we used the same technique to generate the key pool and to provide the key groups, then the 
issue of key sharing technique will get the same performance proposed by Sec-LEACH. 
Another issue discussed by oliveria et.al is the number of CHs in the network [11]. Because all 
CHs use the same single hop to communicate with the B.S, then increasing the number of CH will 
lead to more power consumption. We follow the KD scheme used by Sec-LEACH to produce the 
sharing keys. As we mentioned before, increasing the size of the pool will decrease the number of 
CH produced, where only the nodes that received the first packet and share the same key can then 
proceed with the communication. On the other hand, decreasing the number of CH may results in 
increasing the number of nodes that joined the CHs. 
Providing a suitable size of key pool leads to suitable level of security with high performance, see 
figure (2). 
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Figure2. Security level affected by key pool size and the keys group size, m represents the size of 
each group. 
 
International Journal of  Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.2, No.4, October 2010 
 
73 
 
4.2 Public and Private Keys Method 
In this method, each sensor use two keys for communication with other sensors, Public key and 
Private Key; the idea is similar to the traditional use of public and private keys in asymmetric key 
cryptography in traditional networks. 
Each sensor generates at least one pair of keys that are related mathematically to each other. The 
sensor keeps one of these keys to itself as a private key and broadcasts to its neighbors the other 
key as a Public key. When Sensor A wants to send a message to sensor B, it can follow different 
procedures. The first one is to send an encrypted message to B using Bs public key (Public-key 
encryption). B is the only sensor that is able to decrypt this message using its private key. The 
other scenario is that A sends an encrypted message to B, encrypted using A’s Private key. In this 
case, a successfully decryption of the message by B, using A’s Public key, guarantees that A is the 
one who sent the message (Digital Signature). Another scenario is that A sends an encrypted 
message to B using B’s Public key and send as a part of this message a small part which is 
encrypted using A’s Private key as a signature of A. Another scenario that can be applied is using 
this technique for key exchanges purpose to exchange keys between sensors; in this scenario, A 
sends the secret key that need to share with B, this key and a signature of A is encrypted using B’s 
Public Key. 
4.3 Multi-generations Keys Method 
This method relates to the first method in our solution. The idea is to reuse the keys that produced 
from the key pool in KD technique to support key refreshes and to support the expansion of the 
current sensor network. 
For KD method, B.S. creates a key pool that contains numbers of keys with their IDs. The keys 
distributed upon the sensors randomly in order to have some sharing keys between sensors to use 
during their communications. This technique without any extension does not support the ability to 
refresh the keys implicitly in the future. In order to change a key, the B.S. needs to securely 
communicate with the related sensors and inform them with the new key/s. Furthermore, this 
technique does not support efficiently expandability of the network by adding or replacing 
sensors. 
The new method suggests having the key pool refreshed occasionally without the need to 
announce the existing sensors with these updates. The method works as follows: The B.S. 
randomly generates a number of keys and assigns key ID to each key. The key has to start with a 
specific flag that represents the first generation of key (i.e. 001 for example). The B.S. then 
randomly distributes groups of these keys on the sensors, like in KD method, prior to network 
deployment. The B.S. station also distributes a formula of one way function to all sensors. In 
addition to that, the B.S. station distributes some random numbers with unique IDs for each 
number (the formula and the numbers are the same for all sensors). After a period of time, the 
B.S. may refresh its keys by calculating a new value of each key using its related old key, and one 
of the numbers that are previously distributed to the sensors. The new ID for the key will be the 
second generation flag plus the old key (i.e. 0010… for example). B.S. then distributes the new 
group of keys on its new sensors. Moreover, B.S. may broadcasts some updated keys to the 
sensors that have been compromised by intruders (using the secret key, or public key of the 
specific sensor).  
The sensors can be communicated with each other as follows: the sensor, which needs to send an 
advertising message to its neighbors, includes the IDs of the keys it has in its message with the 
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IDs of the numbers used to create these keys. The receiver then checks the keys IDs without the 
flags to see if there are any IDs in common. In the case that the receiver shares some key/s with 
the sender, it then checks the flag of these IDs to see if it is from the same generation.  Then the 
KD method can be applied without modifications. If the key from different generation then, it 
calculates the new key from the old key and the value that is included in the message, using the 
one way function stored in the sensor. This new key then, can be used during the receiver 
communications with the sender and any other sensor which has the new or the old key with that 
specific key ID see Figure(3). 
 
Figure3. Updating the key value with the new one received from sensor B. 
The key has a lifetime period; this will insure that the sensor memory will always have a space for 
new keys. This method provides sensor networks with the ability to refresh the keys and expand 
the network without limitations.  
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section we analyze our solution and we compare it to some of existing solutions. Applying 
LEACH protocol without any addition provides us with some level of security that has been 
discussed in [10]. This level of security gives WSN the ability to defeat several kinds of insider 
attacks. At the same time, the architecture of the network that LEACH applies makes it vulnerable 
to some attacks like spoofing, jamming, replay, etc. In addition, it is vulnerable to some stage 
attacks like selective forwarding (this kind of attack result from the intruder claims to be a CH). 
KD provides integrity, authenticity freshness and confidentiality to node-to-node communications 
[11].  
Using of Public and Private Keys method increase the level of authentication and integrity that 
have been covered by KD. In addition, it gives the nodes the ability to have a backup plan, with 
low cost, that can be used to transfer the new keys to uncompromised nodes in case of any attack. 
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The technique of multi-generation method provides WSN with the ability to support the 
expansion and the freshness of the network effectively during network life. At the same time it 
provides an additional low-cost technique to isolate the compromised node from the network 
activities. 
5.1 Security in Action 
To declare the security covered by our solution, we discuss the real work of our solution on 
LEACH as an example of dynamic clustering hierarchy protocol. 
Prior to network deployment, B.S. distributes the keys that will be used for data encryption during 
nodes communication. It first generates large number of keys with their IDs as a key pool. It then 
assigns each sensor with a group of keys, with their IDs, picked randomly from the key pool 
without replacement. In addition, it provides each sensor with at least one unique key shared with 
the B.S. which can be used during sensor-B.S. communications. B.S. also distributes some one-
way hash functions with unique ID/s represents each function. In addition, it distributes some 
pairs of values and their IDs to be used with these formulas in order to generate new keys from 
the existing ones.  
At the beginning of the network life, each sensor generates at least one pair of keys that has two 
keys relates to each other. The sensor then keeps one of them secretly as a private key, and 
broadcasts the other key to its neighbors as a public key. Each sensor then checks its availability 
to become a CH for the current round according to some formulas provided by [10]. The actual 
round then begins with each CH broadcasts their advertising messages announcing their ability to 
become CHs for current round. Each message includes the ID of the CH, the IDs of the keys that 
CH has, and the encryption of both CH ID and Keys IDs. The advertising message is encrypted 
using a MAC which is generated using the private key of CH. When the Other sensors receive the 
advertising messages, they check first if they have keys in common from keys IDs provided. Then 
they check the signature of CH by decrypt the message using the corresponding CH public key. If 
the decryption match with the plain text provided, then this ensure that CH with its ID is the one 
who claim to be. Sensors then reply to CH with join-request messages to join the CH cluster. The 
message includes CH ID, sensor ID and the encryption of the message using the MAC generated 
from the key shared with CH. In addition, part of the encrypted message is also encrypted using 
the MAC generated from the corresponding sensor private key. CH receives the messages and 
confirms that each message received is from the one who claims to be. This can be applied by 
decrypting the special part of the message using the corresponding sensor public key. CH then 
broadcasts the replies to all accepted sensors including CH ID and the time schedule for each 
sensor. This message is encrypted using the MAC generated from each key shared with 
corresponding sensors. For all messages transferred between the CH and other sensors, a nonce is 
included to ensure the freshness of the data. 
The previous steps represent the setup phase of LEACH. In this phase, all communications are 
secured using the MAC that is either generated using the private and public keys, or by using the 
shared keys that previously picked from the key pool. This provides data integrity and 
confidentiality, where nonce provides freshness. In addition, the use of public and private keys 
(digital signature) provides authenticity for sensor-CH communications. 
The steady state phase starts with all sensors send their data to their CH. Each message includes 
the ID of the sensor, the ID of the CH, and the encryption of sensor ID, Ch ID, the new value of 
the nonce (nonce+1), and the data itself. Message encrypted using the MAC which is produced 
using the sharing key between each sensor and the CH. CH merges all the messages received from 
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other trusted sensors in one message and then sends it to the B.S. The message includes CH ID, 
B.S. ID, and the encryption of CH ID, B.S. ID and the merged reports. All encrypted using the 
MAC produced from the unique key shared with the B.S. 
The final step supports node-B.S. secure communication by providing integrity and 
confidentiality of the messages between CH and B.S. 
For key freshness and for the network to have new sensors involved, the B.S. regenerates the keys 
in the key pools using the previous keys and their IDs. It takes each key and it updates the first 
part of the key to represent the current generation. Then it creates a new key by applying the one 
way hash function on the old key using one of the values distributed previously on the sensors. 
The new sensors assigned group of keys randomly from the new key pool and then it applies the 
same steps like previously discussed with minor modifications. Sensor, who receives a request for 
communication, checks the IDs provided by the other sensor. It checks the second part of the ID 
to see if it mach with the one it has. Then it checks the first part to see if it is from the same 
generation. If it is from new generation, then the sensor calculates the new key using the one way 
function (i.e. the ID of the function used provided by the sender). The sender also includes the ID 
of the value used in key calculation. The receiver then stores the key in its keys table. Moreover, 
this key can be used in the future communication like before. This technique provides the network 
with key freshness that reduces the ability for attacker to trace the old keys for long period of 
time. In addition, this technique can be used to safely update any compromised key. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
We discussed in this paper three methods represent a complete key management solution that can 
be applied to LEACH, or any similar protocol. Our solution adopted the pair-wise key pre-
distribution to provide WSN with different level of security. The use of public and private keys 
provides WSN with higher security level and provides the sensors an alternative way to exchange 
new keys. Finally, the technique we applied on renewing the key pool provides WSN with an 
ability to support multi-generations of sensors. We shows our solution in action by applying it on 
LEACH. 
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